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Abstract
We review one recent approach to the equity premium puzzle. The key elements of
this approach are loss aversion and narrow framing, two well-known features of decision-
making under risk in experimental settings. In equilibrium, models that incorporate
these ideas can generate a large equity premium and a low and stable risk-free rate,
even when consumption growth is smooth and only weakly correlated with the stock
market. Moreover, they can do so for parameter values that correspond to sensible
predictions about attitudes to independent monetary gambles. The analysis for the
equity premium also has implications for a closely related portfolio puzzle, the stock
market participation puzzle. We suggest some possible directions for future research.
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11 Introduction
One of the best-known stock market puzzles is the equity premium puzzle, which asks why
investors historically appear to have demanded a high average return on stocks, relative
to T-Bills (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). In this essay, we discuss one recent approach to
addressing this puzzle. The broad theme of this approach is that we may be able to improve
our understanding of how people evaluate stock market risk by looking at how they evaluate
risk in experimental settings. More speciﬁcally, this approach argues that loss aversion and
narrow framing, two of the most important ideas to emerge from the experimental literature
on decision-making under risk, may also play an important role in the stock market setting.
Loss aversion is a central feature of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory –
a descriptive theory, based on extensive experimental evidence, of how people evaluate risk.
In this theory, the carriers of value are not absolute levels of wealth, but rather, gains and
losses measured relative to a reference point. Loss aversion is the speciﬁc ﬁnding that people
are much more sensitive to losses – even small losses – than to gains of the same magnitude.
To understand narrow framing, recall that under traditional utility functions deﬁned over
consumption or total wealth, the agent evaluates a new gamble by ﬁrst mixing it with the
other risks he is already facing and then checking whether the combination is attractive. Nar-
row framing, by contrast, is the phenomenon documented in experimental settings whereby,
when people are oﬀered a new gamble, they evaluate it in isolation, separately from their
other risks. In other words, they act as if they get utility directly from the outcome of the
gamble, even if the gamble is just one of many that determine their overall wealth risk. This
contrasts with traditional speciﬁcations, in which the agent would only get utility from the
outcome of the gamble indirectly, via its contribution to his total wealth.
Motivated by these ideas, some recent papers propose that people are loss averse over
changes in the value of their stock market holdings. In other words, even if stock market risk
is just one of many risks that determine their overall wealth risk – others being labor income
risk and housing risk, say – they still get utility directly from stock market ﬂuctuations
(narrow framing) and are more sensitive to losses than to gains (loss aversion). For reasons
we discuss below, most implementations also assume that people focus on annual gains and
losses. Very informally, then, people evaluate stock market risk by saying: “well, stocks
could go up over the next year, with roughly 50% probability; but they could also go down,
with roughly the same probability. I’m much more sensitive to losses than to gains, so this
doesn’t look like an attractive risk to me.” According to the approach we describe in this
essay, it is this sort of thinking that leads the investing population to charge a high premium
for holding the market supply of stocks; in other words, to charge a high equity premium.
Why should ﬁnancial economists be interested in this particular approach to the equity
2premium puzzle? What are its selling points? In this survey, we emphasize two. First, the
framework we describe can generate a high equity premium while also matching other aspects
of the data, such as the low and stable risk-free rate, the low volatility of consumption growth
and the low correlation of stock returns and consumption growth. With some additional
structure, it can also match the high volatility and time-series predictability of stock returns.
A second beneﬁt of our approach is that it can address the equity premium puzzle for
preference parameters that are “reasonable,” by which we mean parameters that also make
sensible predictions about attitudes to independent monetary gambles. This is important
because it was, in part, the diﬃculty researchers encountered in reconciling the high average
return on stocks with reasonable attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles that launched
the equity premium literature in the ﬁrst place.
The approach we describe here was ﬁrst proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). In
their framework, the investor is loss averse over ﬂuctuations in the value of his ﬁnancial
wealth, which, since ﬁnancial wealth is just one component of total wealth, constitutes
narrow framing. One drawback of this framework is that, since the investor gets no direct
utility at all from consumption or total wealth, consumption plays no role, making it hard
to check how well the model describes the joint properties of stock returns and consumption
growth.
Benartzi and Thaler’s work therefore opens up a new challenge: to build and evaluate
more realistic models in which, even if the investor gets utility from ﬂuctuations in the
value of one component of his wealth, he also gets some utility from consumption. In large
part, this essay surveys the progress that has been made on this front, drawing primarily on
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001), Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2003), and Barberis and
Huang (2004).1
The story we tell in this paper is a simple one: investors require a high equity premium
because any drop in the stock market over the next year will bring them direct disutility.
To some readers, this story may be too simple, in that the distance between assumption and
conclusion may appear too close for comfort. We understand this point of view, and we agree
that in order for the loss aversion / narrow framing framework to gain more currency in the
profession, its unique predictions must be tested and conﬁrmed. Fortunately, tests of our
approach are starting to appear in the literature, and we discuss some of them at the end of
the essay. Even before the outcome of these tests is known, however, there is a contribution
in this paper that even a skeptical reader can appreciate, namely a methodological one:
we show how loss aversion and narrow framing can be incorporated into more traditional
models of asset pricing and we use the new models to better understand the predictions of
our approach.
1Other investigationsof loss aversionand narrow framing in a ﬁnancial context include Berkelaar, Kouwen-
berg and Post (2004) and Gomes (2005).
3In Section 2, we discuss loss aversion and narrow framing in more detail, examining both
the evidence they are derived from and some of the interpretations they are given. In Section
3, we show that, once embedded into more traditional utility functions, these features can
generate a high equity premium and a low and stable risk-free rate, even when consumption
growth is smooth and only weakly correlated with stock returns; and moreover, that they
can do so for parameter values that also make sensible predictions about attitudes to both
large-scale and small-scale monetary gambles. We highlight the crucial role that narrow
framing plays in our results by showing that without this feature, the approach loses many
of its advantages. In Section 4, we show that our analysis of the equity premium also has
implications for a portfolio choice puzzle, the stock market participation puzzle. Section 5
considers various extensions of the basic framework, while Section 6 concludes and discusses
possible directions for future research.
Since loss aversion and narrow framing are the deﬁning features of the approach we
describe here, the framework should, strictly speaking, be called the “loss aversion and
narrow framing” approach to the equity premium puzzle. Given that narrow framing is
the more distinctive of the two ingredients, we sometimes abbreviate this to the “narrow
framing” approach.2
2 Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing
Loss aversion is a central feature of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, a
descriptive theory of decision-making under risk, in which the carriers of value are not
absolute wealth levels, but rather, gains and losses measured relative to a reference point.
Loss aversion is a greater sensitivity to losses – even small losses – than to gains of the same
magnitude, and is represented by a kink in the utility function.
The most basic evidence for loss aversion is the fact that people tend to reject gambles
of the form
(110,
1
2
;−100,
1
2
), (1)
to be read as “win $110 with probability 1
2, lose $100 with probability 1
2, independent of
other risks” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). It is hard to
explain this evidence with diﬀerentiable utility functions, whether expected utility or non-
expected utility, because the very high local risk aversion required to do so typically predicts
an implausibly high level of aversion to large-scale gambles (Epstein and Zin, 1990, Rabin,
2Benartzi and Thaler (1995) use the label “myopic loss aversion”. By using this phrase, they emphasize
the investor’s sensitivity to losses (loss aversion) and his focus on annual changes (myopia), but not the
narrow framing. As we will see, narrow framing is more crucial to our results than the annual evaluation of
gains and losses, and so we prefer to emphasize the narrow framing feature while playing down the myopia.
42000, Barberis, Huang and Thaler, 2003).3
The classic demonstration of narrow framing is due to Tversky and Kahneman (1981),
who ask 150 subjects the following question:
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both deci-
sions, then indicate the options you prefer:
Choice (I) Choose between:
A. a sure gain of $240
B. 25% chance to gain $1,000 and 75% chance to gain nothing
Choice (II) Choose between:
C. a sure loss of $750
D. 75% chance to lose $1,000 and 25% chance to lose nothing.
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) report that 84% of subjects chose A, with only 16%
choosing B, and that 87% chose D, with only 13% choosing C. In particular, 73% of subjects
chose the combination A&D, namely
25% chance to win $240, 75% chance to lose $760, (2)
which is surprising, given that this choice is dominated by the combination B&C, namely
25% chance to win $250, 75% chance to lose $750. (3)
It appears that instead of focussing on the combined outcome of decisions I and II – in other
words, on the outcome that determines their ﬁnal wealth – subjects are focussing on the
outcome of each decision separately. Indeed, subjects who are asked only about decision I
do overwhelmingly choose A; and subjects asked only about decision II do overwhelmingly
choose D.
In more formal terms, it appears that we cannot model the typical subject as maximizing
a utility function deﬁned only over total wealth. Rather, his utility function appears to
depend directly on the outcome of each of decisions I and II, rather than just indirectly, via
3There is also strong evidence of what Thaler (1980) calls an “endowment eﬀect,” which can be thought
of as loss aversion in the absence of uncertainty. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) conduct a series
of experiments in which subjects are either given some object such as a coﬀee mug and then asked if they
would be willing to sell it, or not given the mug and then oﬀered the chance to buy one. The authors ﬁnd
that mug owners demand more than twice as much to sell their mugs as non-owners are willing to pay to
acquire one.
5the contribution of each decision to overall wealth. As such, this is an example of narrow
framing.
More recently, Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2003) have argued that the commonly ob-
served rejection of the gamble in (1) is not only evidence of loss aversion, but of narrow
framing as well. To see why loss aversion on its own cannot explain this behavior, note that
most of the subjects who are oﬀered this gamble are typically already facing other kinds of
risk – labor income risk, housing risk, or ﬁnancial market risk, say. In the absence of narrow
framing, they must therefore evaluate the 110/100 gamble by mixing it with these other
risks and then checking if the combination is attractive. It turns out that the combination
is almost always attractive: since the 110/100 gamble is independent of other risks, it oﬀers
useful diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, which, even if loss averse, people can enjoy. The rejection of
the 110/100 gamble therefore strongly suggests that people are not fully merging it with
their other risks, but that to some extent, they are evaluating it in isolation; in other words,
that they are framing it narrowly.
By the same token, any evidence of aversion to a small, independent, actuarially favorable
risk is likely to stem from narrow framing. Examples of such evidence in the ﬁeld are the
high premia consumers pay for telephone wiring insurance and the low deductibles chosen in
automobile insurance contracts (Cicchetti and Dubin, 1994, Rabin and Thaler, 2001, Grgeta
and Thaler, 2003). Similar evidence in experimental data can be found in Bossaerts, Plott
and Zame (2003).4
Motivated by these ideas, some recent papers propose that people are loss averse over
changes in the value of their stock market holdings. In other words, even if stock market risk
is just one of many risks that determine their overall wealth risk – others being labor income
risk and housing risk, say – they still get utility directly from stock market ﬂuctuations
(narrow framing) and are more sensitive to losses than to gains (loss aversion).
Is it plausible that people might frame stock market risk narrowly? To answer this, it
may be helpful to think about how narrow framing can be interpreted. One interpretation is
that it stems from non-consumption utility, such as regret. Regret is the pain we feel when
we realize that we would be better oﬀ today if we had taken a diﬀerent action in the past.
Even if a gamble that an agent accepts is just one of many risks that he faces, it is still linked
to a speciﬁc decision, namely the decision to accept the gamble. As a result, it exposes the
agent to possible future regret: if the gamble turns out badly, he may regret the decision
to accept it. Consideration of non-consumption utility therefore leads quite naturally to
preferences that depend directly on the outcomes of speciﬁc gambles the agent faces.
4For more evidence of narrow framing, see Kahneman and Tversky (1983), Tversky and Kahneman
(1986), Redelmeier and Tversky (1992), Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) and Read, Lowenstein and Rabin
(1999).
6A second interpretation of narrow framing is proposed by Kahneman (2003). He argues
that many decisions are made intuitively rather than through eﬀortful reasoning. Since
intuitive thoughts are by nature spontaneous, they are heavily shaped by the features of the
situation at hand that come to mind most easily; to use the technical term, by the features
that are most “accessible.” In this view, narrow framing occurs because sometimes, when an
agent evaluates a new gamble, the distribution of the gamble, considered separately, is much
more accessible than the distribution of his overall wealth once the new gamble has been
merged with his other risks. The fact that the distribution of the gamble, taken alone, is so
accessible, means that that distribution plays a more important role in decision-making than
would be predicted by traditional utility functions deﬁned only over wealth or consumption.
In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) example, the outcome of each one of choices A,
B, C or D is highly accessible. Much less accessible, though, is the overall outcome once
two choices – A&D, say, or B&C – are combined: the distributions in (2) and (3) are less
“obvious” than the distributions of A, B, C and D given in the original question. As a
result, the outcome of each of decisions I and II plays a bigger role in decision-making than
predicted by traditional utility functions. Similar reasoning can be applied in the case of the
110/100 gamble.
It seems to us that both the “regret” and “accessibility” interpretations of narrow framing
do apply naturally to the stock market. Allocating some fraction of his wealth to the stock
market constitutes a speciﬁc action on the part of the agent – one that he may later regret if
his stock market gamble turns out poorly.5 Alternatively, given our daily exposure, through
newspapers, books and other media, to large amounts of information about the distribution of
the stock market, such information is very accessible. Much less accessible is any information
as to the distribution of future outcomes once stock risk is merged with the other kinds of
risk that people face. Judgments about how much to invest in stocks might therefore be
made, at least in part, using a narrow frame.
The accessibility interpretation of narrow framing also provides a rationale for why in-
vestors might focus on annual gains and losses in the stock market. Much of the public
discussion about the historical performance of diﬀerent asset classes is couched in terms of
annual returns, making the annual return distribution particularly accessible.6
5Of course, investing in T-Bills may also lead to regret if the stock market goes up in the meantime.
Regret is typically thought to be stronger, however, when it stems from having taken an action – for example,
actively moving one’s savings from the default option of a riskless bank account to the stock market – than
from having not taken an action – for example, leaving one’s savings in place at the bank. In short, errors
of commission are more painful than errors of omission.
6Clever tests of this logic can be found in Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Thaler et al. (1997). The latter
paper, for example, asks subjects how they would allocate between a risk-free asset and a risky asset over
a long time horizon – 30 years, say. The key manipulation is that some subjects are given the distribution
of asset returns over short horizons – monthly returns, say – while others are given a long-term return
distribution – the distribution of 30-year returns, say. Since they have the same decision problem, the two
7While Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) experiment provides conclusive evidence of nar-
row framing, it is also somewhat extreme, in that in this example, narrow framing leads
subjects to choose a dominated alternative. In more general situations, this will not be the
case. All the same, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) example does raise the concern that
when applied to asset pricing, narrow framing might give rise to arbitrage opportunities. To
avoid this problem, we focus on applications to absolute pricing – in other words, to the
pricing of assets, like the aggregate stock market, that lack perfect substitutes – because in
such situations, there are no riskless arbitrage opportunities. We would not expect narrow
framing to have much useful application to relative pricing: in this case, any impact that
narrow framing had on prices would create an arbitrage opportunity that could be quickly
exploited.
The normative status of narrow framing depends on the interpretation it is given. If it
stems from non-consumption utility, such as regret, then it can be normatively acceptable:
the agent simply gets utility from things other than consumption, and takes this into ac-
count when making decisions. Since he is acting optimally, there is no reason to expect his
behavior to change over time. Narrow framing is therefore likely to be a permanent feature
of preferences and if it leads the agent to charge a high equity premium today, then it will
lead him to charge a high equity premium in the future as well.
If, however, narrow framing stems from intuitive thinking and from basing decisions only
on “accessible” information, it becomes less acceptable from a normative standpoint. Given
his preferences, the agent would be happier with a diﬀerent decision rule, but has failed
to go through the eﬀortful reasoning required to uncover that rule. In this case, we would
expect the agent’s behavior to change over time, as he learns that his intuitive thinking is
leading him astray, and either through his own eﬀorts, or by observing the actions of others,
discovers a better decision rule. If accessibility-based narrow framing is driving the equity
premium, we would expect the premium to fall over time as investors gradually switch away
from narrow framing.
Our discussion has treated loss aversion and narrow framing as two distinct phenomena.
Recent work, however, suggests that they may form a natural pair, because in those situations
where people exhibit loss aversion, they often also exhibit narrow framing. For example, as
argued above, the rejection of the 110/100 gamble in (1) is evidence not only of loss aversion,
but of narrow framing as well.
groups of subjects should make similar allocation decisions: those subjects given the shorter-term return
distribution should simply use it to infer the more directly relevant longer-term distribution. In fact, these
subjects allocate substantially less to the risky asset, suggesting that they are simply falling back on the
distribution that is most accessible to them, namely the short-term return distribution they were given.
Since losses occur more often in high frequency data, they perceive the risky asset to be especially risky and
allocate less to it.
8Kahneman (2003) suggests an explanation for why loss aversion and narrow framing
might appear in combination like this. He argues that prospect theory captures the way
people act when making decisions intuitively, rather than through eﬀortful reasoning. Since
narrow framing is also thought to derive, at least in part, from intuitive decision-making, it
is natural that prospect theory, and therefore also loss aversion, would be used in parallel
with narrow framing.
3 The Equity Premium
In this section, we discuss various ways of modeling loss aversion and narrow framing, and
then demonstrate the advantages, from the perspective of addressing the equity premium
puzzle, of a model in which investors frame stock market risk narrowly. Speciﬁcally, in
Section 3.2, we show that such a model can generate a high equity premium at the same
time as a low and stable risk-free rate, even when consumption growth is smooth and only
weakly correlated with stock returns; and then, in Section 3.3, that it can do so while also
making reasonable predictions about attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles.
3.1 Modeling loss aversion and narrow framing
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) are the ﬁrst to apply loss aversion and narrow framing in the
context of the aggregate stock market. They consider an investor who is loss averse over
changes in the value of his ﬁnancial wealth, deﬁned here as holdings of T-Bills and stocks.
Since ﬁnancial wealth is just one component of overall wealth – others being human capital
and housing wealth – deﬁning utility directly over ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancial wealth constitutes
narrow framing.
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that, in equilibrium, their investor will charge a high
equity premium. In simple terms, the high volatility of stock returns leads to substantial
volatility in returns on ﬁnancial wealth. Given that he is more sensitive to losses than to
gains, these ﬂuctuations in his ﬁnancial wealth cause the investor substantial discomfort. As
a result, he will only hold the market supply of stocks if compensated by a high average
return.
A weakness of Benartzi and Thaler’s (1995) framework is that, since the investor gets
direct utility only from changes in the value of his ﬁnancial wealth, and none at all from
consumption or total wealth, consumption plays no role, making it hard to check how well the
model describes the joint properties of stock returns and consumption growth. An important
challenge therefore remains: to build and evaluate a more realistic model in which, even if
9the investor gets utility from ﬂuctuations in the value of one component of his wealth, he
also gets some utility from consumption.
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) take up this challenge. Before presenting their speci-
ﬁcation, we introduce the basic economic structure that will apply throughout our essay. At
time t, the investor, whose wealth is denoted Wt, chooses a consumption level Ct and allo-
cates his post-consumption wealth, Wt − Ct, across three assets. The ﬁrst asset is risk-free,
and earns a gross return of Rf,t between t and t + 1. The second asset is the stock market,
which earns a gross return of RS,t+1 over the same interval, and the third is a non-ﬁnancial
asset, such as human capital or housing wealth, which earns a gross return of RN,t+1.T h e
investor’s wealth therefore evolves according to
Wt+1 =( Wt − Ct)((1 − θS,t − θN,t)Rf,t + θS,tRS,t+1 + θN,tRN,t+1) ≡ (Wt − Ct)RW,t+1, (4)
where θS,t (θN,t) is the fraction of post-consumption wealth allocated to the stock market
(the non-ﬁnancial asset) and RW,t+1 is the gross return on wealth between t and t +1 .
A stripped-down version of Barberis, Huang and Santos’ (2001) framework can be written
as follows. The investor maximizes
E0
∞  
t=0
 
ρ
t C
1−γ
t
1 − γ
+ b0ρ
t+1C
−γ
t v(GS,t+1)
 
, (5)
subject to the standard budget constraint, where
GS,t+1 = θS,t(Wt − Ct)(RS,t+1 − 1) (6)
v(x)=
 
x
λx
for
x ≥ 0
x<0
, λ>1, (7)
and where Ct is aggregate per-capita consumption.
The ﬁrst term inside the parenthesis in (5) ensures that, as in traditional models, the
investor gets utility directly from consumption. The second term introduces narrow framing
and loss aversion. The variable GS,t+1 is the change in the value of the investor’s stock
market holdings, computed as stock market wealth at time t, θS,t(Wt − Ct), multiplied by
the net stock market return, RS,t+1−1; v(GS,t+1) represents utility from this change in value.
Narrow framing is therefore introduced by letting the agent get utility directly from changes
in the value of just one component of his total wealth, with b0 controlling the degree of narrow
framing. Loss aversion is introduced via the piecewise linear form of v(·), which makes the
investor more sensitive to declines in stock market value than to increases. Finally, C
−γ
t is a
neutral scaling-term that ensures stationarity in equilibrium.
Equation (6) is the simplest way of expressing the investor’s exposure to stock market
risk. In this case, so long as θS,t > 0, a positive net return is considered a gain and, from
10(7), is assigned positive utility; a negative net return is considered a loss and is assigned
negative utility. Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) work primarily with another, possibly
more realistic formulation,
GS,t+1 = θS,t(Wt − Ct)(RS,t+1 − Rf,t), (8)
in which a stock market return is only considered a gain, and hence is only assigned positive
utility, if it exceeds the risk-free rate.
In Section 2, we noted that even though narrow framing has mainly been documented
in experimental settings, both the “regret” and “accessibility” interpretations suggest that
people may frame the stock market narrowly as well. One could argue that they also suggest
that people will frame their non-ﬁnancial assets narrowly, on the grounds that the distri-
bution of those assets’ returns is also very accessible. The speciﬁcation in (5) can certainly
accommodate such behavior, but we have found that doing so has little eﬀect on our results.
For simplicity, then, we assume that only stock market risk is framed narrowly.
The preferences in (5) are a somewhat simpliﬁed version of Barberis, Huang and Santos’
(2001) speciﬁcation. In an eﬀort to understand not only the equity premium, but also the
volatility and time-series predictability of stock returns, their original model captures not
only loss aversion, but also some dynamic evidence on loss aversion, sometimes known as
the “house money” eﬀect, whereby prior gains and losses aﬀect current sensitivity to losses.
The speciﬁcation in (5) strips out this dynamic eﬀect, leaving only the core features of loss
aversion and narrow framing. We discuss the full model in more detail in Section 5.7
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) assign the preferences in (5), (7), and (8) to the rep-
resentative agent in a simple equilibrium model, and show that when the model is calibrated
to annual data, the narrow framing term can generate a large equity premium and a low and
stable risk-free rate, even when consumption growth is smooth and only weakly correlated
with stock returns. Much as in Benartzi and Thaler (1995), the intuition is that, since the
investor gets direct utility from changes in the value of his stock market holdings, and is
more sensitive to losses than to gains, he perceives the stock market to be very risky and
will only hold the market supply if compensated by a high average return.
Of course, in assigning the utility function in (5) to a representative agent, Barberis,
Huang and Santos (2001) are assuming that the key features of these preferences survive
under aggregation. Intuitively, if individual investors are all loss averse over annual ﬂuctua-
tions in stock market wealth, it is hard to see why this would “wash out” in the aggregate.
However, this point has not yet been formalized.
While the preference speciﬁcation in (5) yields a number of insights, it also has some
7Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) also consider the case in which the gains and losses are gains and
losses in total wealth, rather than in stock market wealth, so that there is no narrow framing at all.
11limitations. First, it does not admit an explicit value function. This makes it hard to
compute attitudes to independent monetary gambles, thereby precluding us from illustrating
one potential beneﬁt of the narrow framing approach. Second, it is highly intractable in
partial equilibrium settings, and so cannot be used to investigate the implications of narrow
framing for portfolio choice. Finally, to ensure stationarity, the narrow framing component
has to be scaled by an ad-hoc factor based on aggregate consumption.
Recently, Barberis and Huang (2004) have proposed a new preference speciﬁcation that
overcomes these limitations. Their starting point is recursive utility, in which the agent’s
time t utility, Vt,i sg i v e nb y
Vt = W(Ct,µ(Vt+1|It)), (9)
where µ(Vt+1|It) is the certainty equivalent of the distribution of future utility, Vt+1, condi-
tional on time t information It,a n dW(·,·) is an aggregator function that aggregates current
consumption Ct with the certainty equivalent of future utility to give current utility (see
Epstein and Zin, 1989, for a detailed discussion). Most implementations of recursive utility
assign W(·,·)t h eC E Sf o r m
W(C,x) = ((1 − β)C
ρ + βx
ρ)
1
ρ, 0 <β<1, 0  = ρ<1, (10)
and assume homogeneity of µ(·). If a certainty equivalent functional is homogeneous, it is
necessarily homogeneous of degree one, so that
µ(kx)=kµ(x), k>0. (11)
In its current form, the speciﬁcation in equation (9) does not allow for narrow framing:
an investor with these preferences only cares about the outcome of a gamble he is oﬀered
to the extent that that outcome aﬀects his overall wealth risk. Barberis and Huang (2004)
show, however, that these preferences can be extended to accommodate narrow framing.
They specify their utility function in a very general context, but for the speciﬁc three-asset
setting introduced earlier, their formulation reduces to
Vt = W (Ct,µ(Vt+1|It)+b0Et(v(GS,t+1))), (12)
where
W(C,x) = ((1 − β)C
ρ + βx
ρ)
1
ρ, 0 <β<1, 0  = ρ<1 (13)
µ(kx)=kµ(x), k>0 (14)
GS,t+1 = θS,t(Wt − Ct)(RS,t+1 − Rf,t) (15)
v(x)=
 
x
λx
for
x ≥ 0
x<0
, λ>1. (16)
Relative to the usual recursive speciﬁcation in equation (9), this new formulation main-
tains the standard assumptions for W(·,·)a n dµ(·). The diﬀerence is that a new term,
12that captures loss aversion and narrow framing, has been added to the second argument
of W(·,·). As before, GS,t+1 represents changes in the value of the investor’s stock market
holdings, measured relative to the risk-free rate. By letting the investor get direct utility
v(GS,t+1) from changes in the value of this one component of his wealth, we are introducing
narrow framing, with the degree of narrow framing again controlled by b0.L o s sa v e r s i o ni s
introduced through the piecewise linearity of v(·), just as in the earlier speciﬁcation in (5).
Since our focus is on the eﬀects of narrow framing, we give the certainty equivalent
functional µ(·) the simplest possible form, namely
µ(x)=( E(x
ζ))
1
ζ, (17)
where the exponent ζ is set to the same value as the exponent in the aggregator function, ρ.
We denote this common value 1 − γ,s ot h a t
ρ = ζ =1− γ. (18)
Throughout this article, we motivate our use of loss aversion by the fact that, as a
central element of prospect theory, it is a robust feature of the way people evaluate risk in
experimental settings. It is worth noting that for the preference speciﬁcation in equation
(12), the piecewise linear form of v(·) can also be motivated without appealing to prospect
theory at all, on grounds of tractability. One way to increase tractability is to impose
homotheticity. Since µ(·) is homogeneous of degree one, homotheticity obtains so long as
v(·)i salso homogeneous of degree one. At the same time, to ensure that the ﬁrst-order
conditions associated with the maximization problem are both necessary and suﬃcient for
optimality, we need v(·) to be concave. The only function that is both homogeneous of
degree one and concave is precisely the piecewise linear function in equation (16).
3.2 Quantitative implications
We now use the speciﬁcation in equation (12) to illustrate two beneﬁts of the narrow framing
approach in more detail: ﬁrst, that it can generate a high equity premium at the same time
as a low and stable risk-free rate, even when consumption growth is smooth and only weakly
correlated with stock returns; and then in Section 3.3, that it can do so while also making
sensible predictions about attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles.
To see the ﬁrst result, consider a simple economy with a representative agent who has
the preferences in equation (12). As before, there are three assets. The risk-free asset is
in zero net supply, and the two risky assets are each in positive net supply. Barberis and
Huang (2004) show that, in this setting, the ﬁrst-order conditions of optimality are
1=
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)
−γ)
  
βEt((
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)
−γRW,t+1)
  γ
1−γ
(19)
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)
1
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)
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0=
Et((
Ct+1
Ct )−γ(RW,t+1 − Rf,t))
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Ct+1
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+ b0Rf,t(
β
1 − β
)
1
1−γ(
1 − αt
αt
)
−γ
1−γθS,tEt(v(RS,t+1 − Rf,t)), (21)
where αt ≡ Ct/Wt is the consumption-wealth ratio, and where RW,t+1 is deﬁned in equation
(4).
We consider an equilibrium in which: (i) the risk-free rate is a constant Rf; (ii) consump-
tion growth and stock returns are distributed as
log
Ct+1
Ct
= gC + σCεC,t+1 (22)
logRS,t+1 = gS + σSεS,t+1, (23)
where  
εC,t
εS,t
 
∼ N
  
0
0
 
,
 
1 ρCS
ρCS 1
  
, i.i.d. over time; (24)
(iii) the consumption-wealth ratio αt is a constant α, which, using
RW,t+1 =
Wt+1
Wt − Ct
=
1
1 − α
Ct+1
Ct
, (25)
implies that
logRW,t+1 = gW + σWεW,t+1, (26)
where
gW = gC +l o g
1
1 − α
(27)
σW = σC (28)
εW,t+1 = εC,t+1; (29)
and (iv) the fraction of total wealth made up by the stock market, θS,t, is a constant over
time, θS,s ot h a t
θS,t =
St
St + Nt
= θS, ∀t, (30)
where St and Nt are the total market value of the stock and of the non-ﬁnancial asset,
respectively. Barberis and Huang (2004) demonstrate that such a structure can indeed be
embedded in a general equilibrium framework with endogeneous production.
Barberis and Huang (2004) also show that under this structure, equations (19)-(21)
simplify to
α =1 − β
1
γR
1−γ
γ
f e
1
2(1−γ)σ2
C (31)
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e
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e
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2σ2
S−γσSσCρCS − Rf (32)
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1
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+
e
gC+ 1
2σ2
C−γσ2
C − Rf, (33)
where
  εS =
log(Rf) − gS
σS
. (34)
We use equations (31)-(33) to compute the equilibrium equity premium. First, we set
the return and consumption process parameters to the values in Table 1. These values are
estimated from annual data spanning the 20th century and are standard in the literature.
Then, for given preference parameters β, γ, b0 and λ, and for a given stock market fraction
of total wealth θS, equations (31)-(33) can be solved for α, Rf and gS, thereby giving us the
equity premium.
Table 2 presents the results. We take β =0 .98 and θS =0 .2, and consider various values
of the preference parameters γ, λ and b0. The parameter β has little eﬀect on attitudes
to risk, and our results are qualitatively very similar for a wide range of values of θS.T h e
table conﬁrms that narrow framing of stocks can generate a substantial equity premium
at the same time as a low risk-free rate. For example, the parameter values (γ,λ,b0)=
(1.5,2,0.1) produce an equity premium of 4.66% and a risk-free rate of 3.3%, while (γ,λ,b0)=
(1.5,3,0.1) produce a premium as high as 8.16% with a risk-free rate of only 2.2%. The
intuition is the same as in Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang and Santos
(2001): if the agent gets utility directly from changes in the value of the stock market and,
via the parameter λ, is more sensitive to losses than to gains, he perceives the stock market
to be very risky and will only hold the available supply if compensated by a high average
return.
Our assumption that the agent evaluates stock market gains and losses on an annual
basis is important for our results, but not critical. Table 3 reports equity premia for an
investor with the preferences in equation (12), but who evaluates stock market gains and
losses at horizons other than a year. The table shows that, even though the equity premium
declines as the time horizon lengthens, long evaluation periods can still generate substantial
equity premia at the same time as a low risk-free rate.
The intuition for the decline in the equity premium for long evaluation periods, ﬁrst
pointed out by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), is straightforward. Since the distribution of
stock returns has a positive mean, the probability of seeing a drop in the stock market falls
as returns are aggregated at longer and longer intervals. While annual stock returns might
be negative 40% of the time, ﬁve-year returns will be negative less often. An agent who is
15loss averse is therefore less scared of stocks when tracking their returns over longer horizons,
and charges a lower equity premium.
3.3 Attitudes to large monetary gambles
We now demonstrate another attractive feature of the preference speciﬁcation in equation
(12), namely that it can deliver a high equity premium for parameterizations that are “rea-
sonable,” in the sense that they make sensible predictions about attitudes to independent
monetary gambles. This is important because it was, in part, the diﬃculty researchers
encountered in reconciling the equity premium with attitudes to monetary gambles that
launched the equity premium literature in the ﬁrst place. Economists are primarily con-
cerned about attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles, so we begin with those. In Section
3.4, we also consider attitudes to small-scale gambles.
The literature has suggested a number of thought experiments involving large-scale gam-
bles. Epstein and Zin (1990) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) consider an individual with
wealth of $75,000 and ask what premium he would pay to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing
$25,000 or gaining the same amount; in Kandel and Stambaugh’s (1991) view, a premium of
$24,000 is too high, but a premium of $8,333 is reasonable. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) think
about the value of x for which an agent would be indiﬀerent between certain consumption of
$x and a consumption gamble oﬀering a 50:50 chance of $50,000 consumption and $100,000
consumption. Rabin (2000) suggests a mild condition, namely that an agent should accept
a clearly attractive large gamble such as a 50:50 bet to win $20 million against a $10,000
loss.
It does not matter, for our results, which of these thought experiments we use. In what
follows, we focus on the one suggested by Epstein and Zin (1990) and Kandel and Stambaugh
(1991). In our view, a reasonable condition to impose is:8
Condition L: An individual with wealth of $75,000 should not pay a premium higher than
$15,000 to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing $25,000 or gaining the same amount.
Barberis and Huang (2004) show that, to avoid a gamble g oﬀering an equal chance to
win or lose x, an investor with the preferences in equation (12) would pay a premium equal
to
π =
A(Wt − (E(Wt + g)1−γ)
1
1−γ)+b0
x
2(λ − 1)
A + b0λ
, (35)
where
A =( 1− β)
1
1−γα
−
γ
1−γ, (36)
8We use the label “condition L” to emphasize that we are thinking about Large-scale gambles.
16with α already computed in equations (31)-(33) above. In this calculation, they make the
simplest possible assumption, namely that whatever degree of narrow framing b0 and level
of loss aversion λ the investor uses when thinking about stock market risk, he also uses when
thinking about the independent monetary gamble g.W h e nb0 = 0, equation (35) gives the
premium that would be charged by an agent with standard power utility preferences. When
b0 > 0, the premium in equation (35) reﬂects the fact that, to some extent, the investor is
framing gamble g narrowly. For large b0, equation (35) reduces to
π =
x
2λ
(λ − 1), (37)
the premium that would be charged by an agent who evaluates gamble g completely in
isolation, and who is λ times as sensitive to losses as to gains.
Using equation (35), the right-most columns in Tables 2 and 3 show, for each parameteri-
zation, the amount that the representative agent would pay, given his equilibrium holdings of
risky assets, to avoid the symmetric bet in condition L. The rows in which b0 = 0 reproduce
a well-known result: that for power utility preferences, those values of γ low enough to make
sensible predictions about attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles inevitably generate too
low an equity premium.
Table 2 shows, however, that as soon as narrow framing is allowed – in other words, as
soon as b0 > 0 – it is easy to ﬁnd parameterizations that give a high equity premium while
also satisfying condition L. When (γ,λ,b0)=( 1 .5,2,0.1), for example, the investor charges
a substantial equity premium of 4.66%, and a reasonable $6,268 to avoid the ±$25,000
gamble.
How is it that the preference speciﬁcation in equation (12) can reconcile attitudes to stock
market risk and to the large-scale monetary gamble in condition L when other speciﬁcations
have trouble doing so? To see how, note ﬁrst that, in the simple representative agent economy
described by conditions (i)-(iv) in Section 3.2, the equity premium is determined by the
agent’s attitude, in equilibrium, to adding a small amount of stock market risk to a portfolio
that is only weakly correlated with the stock market. Why can we say “weakly” correlated?
Since representative agent economies are calibrated to aggregate data, the correlation of
stock returns and consumption growth, ρCS, must be set to a low value; when coupled with
a constant consumption-wealth ratio, this immediately implies a low correlation between
stock returns and returns on total wealth.9
To generate a substantial equity premium, then, we need the agent to be strongly averse
or, at the very least, moderately averse, to a small, weakly correlated gamble. To satisfy
9Of course, in more general representative agent economies, the consumption-wealth ratio need not be
constant, but so long as it is suﬃciently stable, it should still follow that stock returns and returns on total
wealth are only weakly correlated.
17condition L, we need the agent to be mildly averse or, at most, moderately averse, to a large,
independent gamble.
Now consider the two functions in the second argument of W(·,·) in equation (12),
namely µ(·)a n dv(·). For a γ of 1.5, the µ(·) term, by virtue of its local risk-neutrality,
produces only mild aversion to a small, weakly correlated gamble, but moderate aversion
to a large, independent gamble. For a λ of 2, the v(·) term, by virtue of being piece-wise
linear, produces moderate aversion both to a small, weakly correlated gamble and to a large
independent gamble. In combination, then, the two terms generate moderate aversion to
a small, weakly correlated gamble – thereby giving a substantial equity premium – and
moderate aversion to a large, independent gamble, thereby satisfying condition L.
3.4 Attitudes to small monetary gambles
In Section 3.3, we saw that the preferences in equation (12), capturing both loss aversion
and narrow framing, can generate a large equity premium for preference parameters that
also make sensible predictions about attitudes to large-scale monetary gambles, in that they
satisfy condition L. In fact, condition L does not put very sharp restrictions on the range of
equity premia that we can generate: as Table 2 shows, it can be consistent with premia as
low as 0.12% or as high as 8.12%. In this section, we show that by requiring the preference
speciﬁcation in equation (12) to also make sensible predictions about attitudes to small-scale
gambles, we can put much tighter bounds on the range of equity premia that narrow framing
can plausibly generate.
In a way, this is not surprising. As argued earlier, in the simple representative agent
economy of Section 3.2, the equity premium is determined by the agent’s attitude to adding
a small amount of weakly correlated stock market risk to the rest of his portfolio. If we
impose constraints on the investor’s attitudes to small, independent risks, it is likely that
we will also constrain his attitudes to small, weakly correlated risks and thereby also, the
equity premium he will charge.
What kind of condition should we impose on attitudes to small-scale gambles? As with
large-scale gambles, the earlier literature has suggested a number of possible thought exper-
iments. For consistency with our earlier discussion, we return to Epstein and Zin (1990),
who ask how much an individual with wealth of $75,000 would pay to avoid a 50:50 bet to
lose $250 or to win the same amount. In our view, a reasonable condition to impose here
is:10
Condition S: An individual with wealth of $75,000 should not pay a premium higher than
10We use the label “condition S” to emphasize that we are thinking about Small-scale gambles.
18$40 to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing $250 or gaining the same amount.
Figure 1 shows how condition S sharply restricts the range of equity premia that can
be generated by the preferences in equation (12). The “x” signs show, for γ =1 .5, the
range of values of λ and b0 that produce equity premia higher than 5%. Clearly, either a
high sensitivity to losses λ, or a high degree of narrow framing b0, or both, are required
to generate equity premia as large as 5%. Note that our earlier condition on attitudes to
large-scale gambles, condition L, is satisﬁed by all values of λ and b0 spanned by the graph
– in other words, by all pairs (λ,b0)   [0,4] × [0,0.1]. If condition L were the only condition
constraining our choice of preference parameters, we could therefore easily obtain premia
higher than 5%.
The “+” signs in the ﬁgure show the values of λ and b0 that satisfy condition S. Imposing
this condition severely restricts the range of feasible values of λ and b0. In particular, we
cannot obtain premia as high as 5% without violating it.
Even though condition S does restrict the feasible parameter set, it still allows for very
sizeable equity premia. Table 4 lists some parameter values that satisfy both condition L
and condition S, and yet still produce equity premia above 3%.
3.5 The importance of narrow framing
While narrow framing is admittedly an unusual feature of preferences, it is crucial to our
results. To demonstrate this, we now show that, in the absence of narrow framing, it becomes
much harder to replicate some of the attractive features of the preferences in equation (12)
– much harder, for example, to reconcile a high equity premium with reasonable attitudes
to large-scale monetary gambles and, in particular, with the attitudes imposed by condition
L.
Consider a model in which the agent is loss averse over annual changes in total wealth,
rather than in stock market wealth. Such a model maintains the assumptions of loss aversion
and of annual evaluation of gains and losses, but by changing the focus from gains and losses
in stock market wealth to gains and losses in total wealth, it removes the narrow framing.
It can be written as
Vt = W(Ct,µ(Vt+1|It)), (38)
where
W(C,x) = ((1 − β)C
ρ + βx
ρ)
1
ρ, 0 <β<1, 0  = ρ<1, (39)
and where the certainty equivalent functional µ(·) takes a form proposed by Gul (1991),
often referred to as “disappointment aversion”:
µ(V )
1−γ = E(V
1−γ)+( λ − 1)E((V
1−γ − µ(V )
1−γ)1(V< µ (V )),γ = 1. (40)
19While this speciﬁcation looks somewhat messy, it is simply a function with a kink in it, that
makes the investor more sensitive to losses than to gains. The parameter λ controls the
relative sensitivity to losses.11
We consider a simple economy with a representative agent who has the preferences in
equations (38)-(40). The market structure is the same as before. There are three risky assets:
a risk-free asset, in zero net supply, and two risky assets, a stock market and a non-ﬁnancial
asset, each in positive net supply. Epstein and Zin (1989) show that the ﬁrst-order conditions
of optimality are:
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x ≥ 1
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. (44)
We look for a simple equilibrium in which conditions (i)-(iii) of Section 3.2 hold.12 Under
these conditions, equations (41)-(43) become
0=(
β
1 − α
)
1−γ
ρ C1 − 1+( λ − 1)(
β
1 − α
)
1−γ
ρ C1N(εC − (1 − γ)σC) − (λ − 1)N(εC)(45)
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We use equations (45)-(47) to compute the equilibrium equity premium. As before, we
set the return and consumption process parameters to the values in Table 1. Then, for given
11Epstein and Zin (2001) and Ang, Bekaert and Liu (2005) discuss the implementation of disappointment
aversion in dynamic environments.
12It is straightforward to show that such a structure can be embedded in a general equilibrium model.
20preference parameters β, ρ and γ, we use equation (45) to compute the consumption-wealth
ratio α, equation (47) to compute the risk-free rate Rf and equation (46) to compute the
mean log stock return gS.
Since we want to check whether the parameters corresponding to any particular equity
premium are reasonable – in other words, whether they satisfy condition L – we need to
know the premium an agent with the preferences in equations (38)-(40) would pay to avoid
a gamble to win or lose x with equal chance. Following the analysis in Epstein and Zin
(1989), it can be shown that the premium π is given by
π
Wt
=1−
 
(1 + x
Wt)1−γ + λ(1 − x
Wt)1−γ
1+λ
  1
1−γ
. (52)
We set β and ρ, which have little eﬀect on attitudes to risk, to 0.98 and −1, respectively.
The area shaded with “+” signs in Figure 2 shows the values of γ and λ for which the
representative agent satisﬁes condition L; in other words, the values for which, given his
equilibrium holdings of risky assets and wealth of $75,000, he pays a premium below $15,000
to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing $25,000 or winning the same amount. The area shaded with
“x” signs shows the values of γ and λ for which the representative agent charges an equity
premium higher than 2%. There is no overlap between the two regions: in fact, the largest
equity premium that we can generate with this preference speciﬁcation under condition L is
0.98%, far smaller than the equity premia derived from narrow framing in Table 2.13
To see the intuition for this result, recall from Section 3.3 that in the simple, repre-
sentative agent economy considered here, the equity premium is determined by the agent’s
attitude, in equilibrium, to adding an extra dollar of stock market risk to a portfolio that is
only weakly correlated with the stock market. In the absence of narrow framing, the agent
evaluates this extra risk by merging it with his other risks and checking if the combination
is attractive. Since the stock market is only weakly correlated with his other risks, it diver-
siﬁes those other risks and so the combination is attractive: even a loss averse agent enjoys
diversiﬁcation. As a result, he charges a low equity premium. To generate a large premium,
we would need to push up aversion to overall wealth risk, but this would immediately lead
to a violation of condition L.
As we saw in Section 3.3., a simple way out of this diﬃculty is to argue that, when the
agent evaluates the extra dollar of stock market risk, he does not fully merge it with his
other risks, but rather, evaluates it in isolation; in other words, that he frames stock market
risk narrowly.
13Epstein and Zin (1990) and Epstein and Zin (2001) obtain comparable results. See also Bekaert, Hodrick
and Marshall (1997).
214 Other Applications
Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2003) argue that the preferences in equation (12) can also
address a portfolio puzzle that is closely related to the equity premium puzzle, namely the
stock market participation puzzle: the fact that even though stocks have a high mean return,
many households have historically been unwilling to allocate any money to them. Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991) report, for example, that in 1984, only 28% of households held any stock
at all, and only 12% held more than $10,000 in stock. Non-participation was not simply the
result of not having any liquid assets. Even among households with more than $100,000 in
liquid assets, only 48% held stocks (see also Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995).
One approach to this puzzle is to argue that there are transaction costs of investing in
the stock market; another is to examine whether non-stockholders have background risk
that is somewhat correlated with the stock market (Heaton and Lucas 1997, 2000, Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2002). A third approach is based on heterogeneity in individual preferences, and
this is the one Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2003) focus on. Speciﬁcally, they show that the
preferences in equation (12) can generate stock market non-participation and, mirroring our
results for the equity premium, that they can do so for preference parameterizations that
are reasonable, in other words, that make sensible predictions about attitudes to large-scale
monetary gambles by, for example, satisfying condition L.
It is easy to see how these preferences generate non-participation: if the agent gets direct
utility from ﬂuctuations in the value of any stocks that he owns, and if he is loss averse
over these ﬂuctuations, he is naturally going to be averse to stock market risk, and may well
refuse to participate.
How is it that we can generate non-participation for reasonable parameter values? An
agent who refuses to participate in the stock market is eﬀectively refusing to take on a small
amount of a risk that is, according to Heaton and Lucas (2000), relatively uncorrelated
with his other risks. To generate such attitudes at the same time as reasonable attitudes
to large-scale gambles, we therefore need preferences that generate moderate aversion to a
small, weakly correlated risk – thereby leading to stock market non-participation – at the
same time as moderate aversion to a large independent risk, thereby satisfying condition L.
As discussed in Section 3.3., the preferences in equation (12) are able to achieve exactly this.
Without narrow framing, it becomes much harder to ﬁnd preference speciﬁcations that
can generate non-participation for reasonable parameter values. In the absence of narrow
framing, the agent decides whether to participate by mixing a small amount of stock market
risk with his other risks and checking whether the combination is attractive. Since stock
market risk is largely uncorrelated with his other risks, it is diversifying and so the com-
bination is, quite generally, attractive. To prevent the agent from participating, we need
22to impose very high aversion to overall wealth risk, but this typically leads to implausible
aversion to large-scale gambles, and in particular, to violations of condition L. This logic
has been conﬁrmed by Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2003),
who consider a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations without narrow framing – including spec-
iﬁcations that incorporate loss aversion – and ﬁnd that all of them have trouble generating
non-participation for reasonable parameter values.14
5 Further Extensions
5.1 Dynamic aspects of loss aversion
In a full equilibrium model, the preferences in (5) and (12) can easily deliver a high equity
premium and a low and stable risk-free rate, but they have a harder time matching the
empirical volatility of returns. Under these preferences, the volatility of returns is typically
very similar to the volatility of dividend growth, and therefore too low.
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) show that incorporating dynamic aspects of loss
aversion into the speciﬁcation in (5) can help match the empirical volatility of returns.15
Drawing on a number of diﬀerent experimental tests, Thaler and Johnson (1990) argue that
the degree of loss aversion is not constant over time, but depends on prior gains and losses.
In particular, they present evidence that losses are less painful than usual after prior gains,
perhaps because those gains cushion any subsequent loss; but that losses after prior losses
are more painful than usual, perhaps because people have only limited capacity for dealing
with bad news.
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) capture this evidence by making v(·) in (5) a function
not only of the current stock market return RS,t+1 but also of prior gains and losses in the
stock market. They then show that this raises the volatility of returns relative to the volatility
of dividend growth: on good dividend news, the stock market goes up, giving the investor a
cushion of prior gains and making him less sensitive to future losses; as a result, he perceives
stocks to be less risky and discounts their future cash ﬂows at a lower rate, thereby pushing
prices still higher and raising the volatility of returns. The same mechanism also generates
predictability in the time series: after prior gains, the investor perceives the stock market
to be less risky and so pushes the price of stocks up relative to dividends; but from this
point on, average returns will be lower, as the investor needs less compensation for the lower
14An alternative preference-based approach to the stock market participation puzzle is based on ambiguity
aversion (Epstein and Schneider, 2002). This approach has some similarities to the narrow framing approach,
in that it works by inducing something akin to loss aversion over the stock market gamble itself.
15A similar analysis can be conducted with the speciﬁcation in equation (12).
23perceived risk. Price-dividend ratios therefore predict returns.
One attractive feature of this mechanism is that it preserves the low correlation of stock
returns and consumption growth seen in the earlier models of Section 3: since movements
in the price-dividend ratio are driven by innovations to dividends, the correlation of stock
returns and consumption growth is similar to the correlation of dividend growth and con-
sumption growth, and is therefore low. This contrasts with other models of stock market
volatility, such as that of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), in which movements in the price-
dividend ratio are driven by innovations to consumption. These models inevitably lead to a
high correlation of stock returns and consumption growth.
5.2 Other forms of narrow framing
In the economy described in Section 3, there were only two risky assets – the stock market
and a non-ﬁnancial asset. There were therefore only a limited number of ways in which
narrow framing could manifest itself. The investor could get direct utility from stock market
ﬂuctuations, direct utility from ﬂuctuations in the value of the non-ﬁnancial asset, or both.
A more realistic model would allow the investor to trade not only a broad stock market
index, but individual stocks as well. Narrow framing could then, in principle, mean that the
investor gets direct utility from ﬂuctuations in the value of individual stocks that he owns.
What eﬀect would this have?
Barberis and Huang (2001) investigate this issue by extending the preferences in (5) to
allow the agent to frame several assets narrowly.16 Among other implications, they ﬁnd
that, if investors engage in the more extreme form of narrow framing whereby they frame
even individual stocks narrowly, the equity premium can be even higher than in the case
studied in Section 3, where they frame only their overall portfolio of stocks narrowly: if
investors worry about ﬂuctuations in highly volatile individual stocks rather than just in the
less volatile aggregate stock market, they perceive stocks to be very risky and charge a very
high premium for holding stock in equilibrium.
Is it plausible that people might frame individual stocks narrowly? From a theoretical
perspective, it is hard to tell. Consider Kahneman’s (2003) “accessibility” theory of framing.
It is true that for most investors, information about the value of individual stocks that they
own is highly accessible. But so too is information about the value of their overall stock
portfolio, and it seems that given a choice between the broader frame and the narrower one,
people will choose the normatively more acceptable frame, namely the broader one, for their
decision-making.
16A similar analysis can be performed using the formulation in equation (12).
24Under the alternative theory that narrow framing is related to non-consumption utility
such as regret, framing at the level of individual stocks becomes more plausible. If one of
the investor’s stocks performs poorly, he may regret the speciﬁc decision to buy that stock.
Gains and losses on individual stocks can therefore be carriers of utility in their own right,
and the investor may take this into account when making decisions.
The framing of individual stocks is also supported by the well-known disposition eﬀect –
the fact that when individual investors sell stocks in their portfolios, they tend to sell stocks
that have gone up in value since they bought them, rather than stocks that have gone down
(Shefrin and Statman, 1984, Odean, 1998). The leading explanation of this ﬁnding is that
people get direct utility from realizing a loss on an individual stock that they own and that
this leads them to postpone selling a losing stock for as long as possible.17
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this essay, we discuss a recent approach to the equity premium puzzle. The broad theme of
this approach is that we may be able to improve our understanding of how people evaluate
stock market risk by looking at how they evaluate risk in experimental settings. More
speciﬁcally, this approach argues that loss aversion and narrow framing, two of the most
important ideas to emerge from the experimental literature on decision-making under risk,
may also play an important role in the stock market setting.
We discuss various ways of incorporating loss aversion and narrow framing into more
traditional utility functions, and then show that models with these features may indeed oﬀer
an attractive way of thinking about the equity premium puzzle. For example, they can
generate a high equity premium and a low and stable risk-free rate, even when consumption
growth is smooth and only weakly correlated with the stock market; moreover, they can
do this for parameter values that are reasonable, in that they make sensible predictions
about attitudes to independent monetary gambles. A parallel result holds in the case of
the stock market participation puzzle, a portfolio puzzle that is closely related to the equity
premium puzzle: with narrow framing, we can generate non-participation for very reasonable
parameter values.
While these initial results are promising, much work remains to be done. The most
obvious direction for future research is to think about other testable implications of the
17Tax considerations point to the selling of prior losers, so they cannot explain the disposition eﬀect. Nor
can the eﬀect be explained by a rational belief in mean-reversion: the stocks that individual investors sell
actually outperform the ones they buy (Odean, 1998). Even an irrational belief in mean-reversion is an
unlikely explanation because individual investors not holding stocks that have recently gone down in value
do not tend to buy them, as they should if they were anticipating a rebound.
25loss aversion / narrow framing view. For example, while narrow framing makes a blanket
prediction of non-participation in the stock market, does it also make more detailed pre-
dictions about what kinds of people are more likely to participate than others? Does it
predict changes in participation over time, perhaps due to changes in framing? Are there
any real-world situations in which people are asked to make a certain ﬁnancial decision after
seeing some data, and that have the feature that while everyone sees the same data, some
people see it presented somewhat diﬀerently than others? The diﬀerences in the way the
data is presented could lead people to frame future outcomes diﬀerently, and therefore to
make diﬀerent choices.
Researchers have already begun testing our view of the equity premium and participation
puzzles. Dimmock (2005) describes a recent survey in Holland in which subjects were given
a decision problem involving riskless choice. Responses to this decision problem can be used
to extract estimates of individual loss aversion. After extracting these estimates from the
data, Dimmock (2005) ﬁnds that individuals with greater loss aversion are indeed less likely
to participate in the stock market.
Narrow framing is harder to measure than loss aversion, but successful tests of narrow
framing in other settings suggest that progress can also be made in the context of the equity
premium and stock market participation puzzles. Kumar and Lim (2004), for example, test
the idea that narrow framing is behind the disposition eﬀect by checking whether individual
investors who engage less in narrow framing also exhibit less of a disposition eﬀect. They
identify these investors as those who tend to execute more than one trade on any given day,
and who therefore might pay less attention to the outcome of any one transaction. They
ﬁnd that these investors do indeed exhibit less of a disposition eﬀect.
Our attempt to bring psychology into economics has also served to highlight some areas
of the original psychology where more research would be valuable. While there is now ample
evidence that, in some situations, people frame narrowly, we still do not fully understand
when people frame narrowly and when they do not, nor what the underlying causes of
narrow framing are. Similarly, while loss aversion itself is a robust and well-documented
phenomenon, much less is known about its dynamic aspects: for example, about how past
gains and losses aﬀect subsequent loss aversion. Thaler and Johnson (1990) provide some
valuable evidence on this point, but it is hard to believe that theirs is the last word. A better
understanding of these issues, perhaps through more experimental research, may eventually
help us craft better models of how people evaluate stock market risk.
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30Table 1: Parameter values for a representative agent equilibrium model: gC and
σC are the mean and standard deviationof log consumptiongrowth,σS is the stan-
dard deviation of log stock returns, and ρCS is the correlation of log consumption
growth and log stock returns.
Parameter
gC 1.84%
σC 3.79%
σS 20.0%
ρCS 0.10
31Table 2: The table shows, for given aversion to consumption risk γ, sensitivity to
narrowly framed losses λ, and degree of narrow framing b0, the risk-free rate Rf
and equity premium EP generated by narrow framing in a simple representative
agent economy. πL is the premium the representative agent would pay, given his
equilibrium holdings of risky assets and wealth of $75,000, to avoid a 50:50 bet
to win or lose $25,000.
γλ b 0 Rf EP πL
1.5 2 0 4.7% 0.12% $6,371
1.5 2 0.05 3.6% 3.75% $6,285
1.5 2 0.1 3.3% 4.66% $6,268
1.5 3 0 4.7% 0.12% $6,371
1.5 3 0.05 2.6% 7.06% $8,037
1.5 3 0.1 2.2% 8.16% $8,193
3 2 0 6.9% 0.24% $11,754
3 2 0.05 4.9% 3.40% $8,214
3 2 0.1 4.3% 4.45% $7,305
3 3 0 6.8% 0.24% $11,754
3 3 0.05 2.8% 6.91% $8,901
3 3 0.1 2.0% 8.22% $8,561
32Table 3: The table shows, for given aversion to consumption risk γ, sensitivity to
narrowly framed losses λ, and degree of narrow framing b0, the risk-free rate Rf
and equity premium EP generated by narrow framing in a simple representative
agent economy. πL is the premium the representative agent would pay, given his
equilibrium holdings of risky assets and wealth of $75,000, to avoid a 50:50 bet
to win or lose $25,000. T is the horizon, in years, over which stock market gains
and losses are measured.
Tγ λ b 0 Rf EP πL
0.5 1.5 2 0.1 2.4% 7.60% $6,257
1 1.5 2 0.1 3.3% 4.66% $6,268
2 1.5 2 0.1 3.9% 2.56% $6,287
3 1.5 2 0.1 4.1% 1.72% $6,300
Table 4: The table shows, for given aversion to consumption risk γ, sensitivity to
narrowly framed losses λ, and degree of narrow framing b0, the risk-free rate Rf
and equity premium EP generated by narrow framing in a simple representative
agent economy. πL (πS) is the premium the representative agent would pay, given
his equilibrium holdings of risky assets and wealth of $75,000, to avoid a 50:50
bet to win or lose $25,000 ($250).
γλ b 0 Rf EP πL πS
1.5 2 0.035 3.7% 3.18% $6,296 $39.1
1.5 3 0.012 3.8% 3.12% $7,268 $38.4
3 2 0.042 5.1% 3.10% $8,494 $37.5
3 3 0.016 5.0% 3.26% $10,184 $38.9
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Figure 1. The “x” signs show the parameter values for which an agent who is loss averse
over stock market risk would charge an equity premium higher than 2% in a simple rep-
resentative agent economy. The “+” signs show where the agent would pay a premium
below $40 to avoid a 50:50 bet to win or lose $250 at a wealth level of $75,000.
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Figure 2. The “x” signs show the parameter values for which an agent with a recursive
utility function with Gul (1991)-type certainty equivalent would charge an equity pre-
mium higher than 2% in a simple representative agent economy. The “+” signs show
where the agent would pay a premium below $15,000 to avoid a 50:50 bet to win or lose
$25,000 at a wealth level of $75,000.
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